Competitive tendering in an entry regulated market—an accident waiting to happen? by Jørgen Aarhaug
ORIGINAL PAPER
Competitive tendering in an entry regulated market—an accident
waiting to happen?
Jørgen Aarhaug1
Received: 18 June 2014 /Accepted: 9 April 2015 /Published online: 23 April 2015
# The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at SpringerLink.com
Abstract
Introduction Competitive tendering was introduced in the
contract segment of the Norwegian taxi industry in 2005; a
market characterised by entry regulation. Using this reform as
a natural experiment this research looks into how competitive
tendering has resulted in different outcomes in different seg-
ments of the taxi market and which explanations are best at
describing the results.
Methods The main sources of data are the taximeter data and
case studies, conducted as part of a study of the rural taxi
industry in Norway. This data have been supplemented by
interviews with key stakeholders and data on prices and vol-
umes from various purchasers of transport services, such as
health corporations and county governments.
Results The empirical data shows a lot of variation. There are
very different outcomes in the different cases studied.
However, the research shows that competitive tendering has
mostly worked according to intention in the most central re-
gions. These are characterised bymany potential suppliers and
that the tendered contracts are relative small compared with
the total size of the market. I rural areas the results differ, with
poor results from tendering in the intermediate areas andmost-
ly satisfactory results in the most rural areas.
Conclusions Experience from the Norwegian taxi industry
shows that competitive tendering is possible within entry-
regulated markets. Still, there are issues that remain to be
solved, in particular in rural areas. This is due to both interde-
pendency between the purchaser and the service provider, and
the size of the markets. For other sectors, the main lessons are
that competitive tendering can work, even with regulated en-
try, but that it needs to be adapted to suit the characteristics of
each market. This research shows that there is significant var-
iation within a sector. A tool such as competitive tendering can
be well suited in one area, but inappropriate in another. This
research suggests that the outcome is related to both hard
factors such as market size and number of entrants, but also
to factors like interdependency and negotiation climate.
Keywords Taxi regulation . Competitive tendering . Entry
regulation . Rural taxi
1 Introduction
The provision of public services in rural communities is chal-
lenging in many different contexts because population densi-
ties are low and distances are often long. The transport com-
ponent of the cost of providing such services is therefore even
more important in rural than in urban or suburban settings. In
this paper, I examine the relationship between competition and
entry regulation in small taxi markets, and, more generally, the
challenges posed by competitive tendering.
In the case of public health care, the realization that transport
had become a significant part of costs was one of the arguments
when responsibility for the transport of patients was moved
from regional authorities, county governments, to newly creat-
ed health corporations as part of major organizational reform in
Norway in 2004. The main objective of the reform was more
efficient use of available health funding by creating larger units
with state rather than county funding, and by making one and
the same authority responsible for both treatment and transport.
Health corporations were therefore given the incentive to in-
corporate transport when costing their decisions on treatment.
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Transportation to and from treatment usually means getting
patients from home to hospital, between different hospitals or
from hospitals to home, i.e. few passengers per trip and wide
area coverage. Within the Norwegian legal framework, this
transport can be undertaken in one of three ways: First, by taxi,
i.e. a vehicle with a legal taximeter, fewer than 17 seats and
registered as a taxi; second, by a private bus company, i.e. whose
vehicles have nine or more passenger seats registered under an
occasional passenger transport licence; and, third, by the health
corporation’s own vehicles, i.e. buses on licence but operated by
health corporation staff. In the case of all three alternatives, the
responsible dispatching unit is located within the health corpo-
ration. Transfer of the dispatching service from private taxi com-
panies to the health corporation is common to all alternatives.
Under the previous regulatory framework, transport was
conducted by the taxi industry on behalf of county govern-
ments. For the industry itself, the transportation of patients
was seen as a vital part of demand in rural areas in particular.
Within the Norwegian framework, the taxi industry is sub-
ject to entry regulation based on the number of taxi vehicles
needed in an area. When a large part of the demand suddenly
becomes uncertain—as with the introduction of competitive
tendering and competition from other sectors—which has
been the case with regulatory reform of the health corpora-
tions, an already difficult situation becomes even more diffi-
cult. This was the starting point of Osland et al.’s research in
2010 [1] conducted for the Ministry of Transport and
Communications with the purpose of mapping areas where
the transport service had changed due to the reform, the author
was responsible for the empirical part of that report.
In this paper, I start with a description of the taxi industry in
Norway and an explanation of the regulatory changes and
their different contexts. I go on to discuss the theoretical ex-
pectations (Section 2) and empirical findings (Section 3) and,
finally, discuss (Section 4) and pinpoint the lessons learned
from this natural experiment (Section 5).
1.1 The Norwegian taxi industry
In Norway, just as in many other countries, the taxi industry is
a form of public transport providing door-to-door service in
direct response to demand. Compared to other forms of public
transport, vehicles and typical passenger flows are smaller. In
Norway, a taxi is defined as a vehicle, with driver, that is
available for public hire and does not operate on a fixed sched-
ule. There are few national requirements for vehicles, but one
is a maximum number of 17 seats, including the driver. This
differs from typical Anglo-Saxon definitions, which differen-
tiate between pre-booked and street-hire vehicles. In terms of
value, the Norwegian taxi industry had a turnover of approx-
imately €1.1 billion in 2013.1 Overall, approximately half of
this was contract work, the major contracting partners being
the different health corporations. The total public procurement
of taxi services was thus approximately 50 % higher than that
of passenger rail transport in Norway (€0.35 billion in 2013).2
So, even though individual contracts are small, the total value
is substantial.
For analytical purposes the taxi business can be divided
into several market segments with different characteristics.
The main difference in the taxi market is between single
trip and contract work. In single-trip segments, passengers
contact the taxi directly (kerb/rank/street) or through a dis-
patcher (pre-booked). In contract segments, a company or a
public body negotiates with a taxi dispatcher over a contract
for multiple transport assignments. The contract will typically
include a simple payment scheme and discounts on the taxi-
meter rates or on fares calculated after criteria other than the
taximeter fare.
The market segments illustrated in Fig. 1 have different
characteristics depending on, for example, demand structure,
supply structure and price formation. Consequently, the ideal
regulation will vary across these segments [3].
The taxi licensing system in Norway is based on the
owner-operator as the main unit, and in areas viable
economically, owner-operators can be affiliated to a
dispatching company. Affiliation is compulsory in urban
areas. An operating licence is required, with each owner
a qualified driver and each vehicle a separate licence. In
principal, one licence per owner, but a licence for a
backup vehicle is common. If there are no new appli-
cants for a licence, someone who is already a licence-
holder can be assigned more licences. The total number
of licences is determined in a variety of ways by dif-
ferent local authorities and county governments are re-
sponsible for regulation. The law3 requires local govern-
ment to restrict the number of licences through needs
assessment, but does not state how this is to be done.
How and the extent to which this form of entry regula-
tion is a barrier to entry will vary. In some areas, there
are many applicants for the available licences, while in
others the local authorities have great difficulty finding
people willing to take on the responsibilities faced by
the licence-holder, one of which is a 24-h availability
requirement [4].
Furthermore, Norwegian taxi regulations stipulate two-tier
pricing. Although the norm is maximum fares set by the
Norwegian competition authorities, there are seven exempted
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defined by municipal borders and constitute the largest cities
in Norway.4 The prices in the contract segments are always set
in the market, and never regulated by the central authorities.
1.2 Methods
The paper is based on research presented in several reports
[1–6] on taxi regulation, competitive tendering and conflicting
regulatory systems. All of these studies take into consideration
a combination of qualitative and quantitative data and are
supported here by new interviews of key actors and new anal-
ysis of publically available statistics, economic data and pro-
duction data from various taxi dispatching companies and
health corporations, together with licence data from regional
governments in Norway. Some of the data collected from
earlier reports have been re-analysed. I draw on all these
sources of information, but omit data from the reports that
are not relevant for the purpose of the paper, including the
Norwegian experience of competitive tendering in entry-
regulated and small markets.
One important source is the data collection and analysis
conducted in the Osland et al. (2010) [1] study, which includes
a survey of all 19 counties in Norway and an in-depth study of
three. In Section 3, examples from comparable municipalities
where competitive tendering has had different impacts are
selected from parts of the Osland et al. study [1].
2 Regulation and competition
From auction theory we would expect prices to reflect the
competition situation, i.e. prices dropping in response to the
number of entrants increasing. On contract market segments
the entrants are the dispatchers or the minibus companies. If
the dispatching company is dependent on a contract for its
existence, one would expect to find the competitive outcome
even in a situation with only one competitor to the incumbent.
However, this will only work in the first round of competitive
tendering. In the second, the expectation is that there will be
only one actor. If there were no competitors, one would expect
the price to be the result of the relative power of the negotiat-
ing parties. Because in the short and medium run they are
interdependent, it is difficult to predict the outcome.
Looking at the structure of taxi markets there are several
reasons why a system based on competitive tendering of pub-
lic contracts can fail. There is the legal issue concerning entry
regulation and of not allowing licences to accompany the con-
tracts. And there are the economic issues of scale and scope
giving licence-holders economic benefits from being associ-
ated with the largest dispatcher.
The introduction of competitive tendering to an entry-
regulated industry such as the Norwegian taxi industry raises
many theoretical and practical questions. In this section, I
present some of the theoretical arguments and follow up with
three explanations which I use in the empirical discussion.
2.1 Arguments for introducing competitive tendering
in the Norwegian taxi industry
The theoretical basis behind the introduction of competitive
tendering is that it will result in lower prices for the purchaser
through efficiency gains. It is expected that the price in the
market will be equal to the second most efficient producer’s
marginal cost [7]. This is straightforward economic theory,
which has been introduced in a number of previously publi-
cally run industries, mostly with lower unit costs as a result
[8]; it is also part of most European government policies.
The theoretical argument for entry regulation through
needs testing is based on increasing returns to scale, i.e. taxi
dispatchers with allocated vehicles constitute a network with
increasing returns to density. Arnott (1996), among others, has
created a model for this argument [9]. Controlling the number
of vehicles can also be used as an instrument by which Bliving
wages^ are assured in an industry where wages vary with
demand. In economic terms, controlling supply is used to
increase the attractiveness of the industry for operators and
improve the benefits from economies of scale and scope. On
a policy level, entry restrictions are seen in the context of non-
direct economic support for keeping prices (fares) below mar-
ket levels and maintaining a 24-h service, even when not eco-
nomically viable. In effect, a monopoly rent is accepted as
compensation for prices below market level and a 24-h ser-
vice, as these and the network effects dictate an undersupply
of taxis, and overcharging in the free market solution.
2.2 Arguments opposing competitive tendering
There are at least three arguments suggesting that the condi-
tions for a functioning auction are not in place in the
Norwegian taxi industry they relate to the economics created
by the present structure of the taxi industry. First, there are
4 http://www.lovdata.no/cgi-wift/wiftldles?doc=/app/gratis/
www/docroot/ltavd1/filer/sf-20040225-0485.html&emne=
maksimalprisforskrift*& last visited July 2013
Taxi 
market 









Fig. 1 Taxi market segments (adopted from Longva et al. 2010 [2])
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entry regulations, second, there are economies of scale and,
third, there are economies of scope.
1) The entry regulation limits the number of new entrants to
the market. It is illegal for the licensing authority to issue a
new permit allowing a new entrant on a particular con-
tract. However, it is legal to allocate new licences to par-
ticular dispatchers if increased competition in the market
is the result. This creates a situation in which there is a
limit to the number of potential contractors, unlike the bus
service industry, where one tender can attract competitors
from other parts of the country or internationally. The
number and allocation of the licences between dispatchers
must be taken as a given in each tender.
2) There are few or no economies of scale in operating a taxi
vehicle, but significant economies of scale in dispatching
(see 2.1). As most tendered transport is dependent on a
dispatcher functioning as an intermediary between client
and driver, there are scale benefits. How large will depend
on the form of contract and on the distribution of respon-
sibility between the authority ordering the transport and
the dispatcher. This relation has changed during the pro-
cess of competitive tendering in the direction of more
responsibility with the public authority reducing the econ-
omies of scale [1]. However, as there are still significant
economies of scale in the pre-booked market segment,
which is economically important for taxi owners, each
owner will prefer to be associated with the largest dis-
patcher in the area, as this will provide the expected re-
turn. A new dispatcher entering the market is therefore
faced not only with the normal start-up cost, but also with
the licence owners’ disincentive to choose the new
entrant.
3) Economies of scope come from the fact that taxi demand
fluctuates constantly [6]. Taxis operate in different market
segments at different times, and consequently the operator
will be active in different market segments as a means of
utilizing his vehicle efficiently with lower unit costs and
higher profits for the owner. Again, this will favour in-
cumbent dispatchers, as they can offer more pre-booked
trips from their enlarged network. The incumbent will
typically have more licences associated and as a result
be able to divide the fixed cost of operating a dispatching
company over a larger number of vehicles, and therefore a
lower fixed cost per vehicle.
2.3 Experience from other sectors
Benefits from the introduction of competitive tendering in
public transport have beenwell documented by, among others,
Bekken et al. [8] using Norwegian data and Alexandersson
and Pyddoke [10] using Swedish data. The main benefit has
been in the form of lower prices. These authors typically find
cost reductions of about 20 %. Together with the benefits,
there has been a restructuring of the bus service industry into
fewer and larger companies competing nationally and interna-
tionally, rather than just locally [11, 12]. Over time, competi-
tion has been working, with prices remaining low even in the
second and later rounds of tendering [10]. Comparable studies
of the effect of competitive tendering on the taxi service in-
dustry have not been carried out in Norway, and to the au-
thor’s knowledge nowhere else either.
One of the main developments in the bus service industry
following the introduction of competitive tendering has been
the establishment of national companies and the introduction
of international companies competing with each other for con-
tracts in different regions, when previously competitive ten-
dering companies were mostly local. This has created a repet-
itive game in which the regulator’s main task is in ensuring
that no cartels or rigged auctions take place. The move from a
non-competitive local industry to a national competitive in-
dustry is possibly a development for the taxi industry.
However, in the taxi industry the markets are still mostly
local, particularly in non-contract segments. There are
dispatching companies operating on a national and interna-
tional level, but licences are tied to the counties and owner
operators, thus creating different game dynamics between the
taxi industry and the bus service industry.
Differences can be found when translating these observa-
tions into game-theory. In particular, we can expect a particu-
lar form of Bertrand competition [13]. If we decide to look at
auctions as a non-repetitive game, which it can be argued is
the case in rural areas in particular, the competition will need
only two competitors in reaching an efficient outcome. As
both competitors are faced with the choice of submitting a
winning bid, or bankruptcy, following Bertrand’s theory they
will be expected to submit a competitive bid. However, if so,
there will only be one actor at the end of the contract period,
and after the contract there will be only one actor left, who will
then be expected to submit its future bids as a monopoly
supplier. In other words, the local structure of the taxi industry
can create local monopolies because of competitive tendering.
In this way, competitive tendering can result in reduced com-
petition over time.
2.4 Expectations
The rationale for introducing competitive tendering is an ex-
pectation from theory; namely, that auctioning provision of
the service will allow the most efficient producer to operate
[7] and gain experience from other sectors [8]. It will create
competition in an otherwise uncompetitive market and pro-
mote a more efficient use of public funds. Instead of compe-
tition for individual trips (competition in the market), there is
competition for a contract in the form of an auction.
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The pre-reform regime prompted a series of questions on
the efficiency and transparency of the system [14], mainly
questions connected with information asymmetry. County
governments perceived themselves as being in a classical prin-
cipal–agent dilemma unable to distinguish between high and
low quality high price actors.
In theory, it is debatable whether or not the taxi industry is a
natural monopoly; however, it is common to assume econo-
mies of scale in dispatching for the relevant market sizes [11,
15, 16]. Moreover, the expected market structure with local
monopolies is observed in rural areas in Norway. In this arti-
cle, I will assume that the natural monopoly approach is
correct.
Owing to the specific regulations of the taxi industry entry
regulation, regulated prices (on non-contract market seg-
ments) and the obligation to provide transport services at
odd hours—actors such as the Taxi Owners’Association have
argued that the benefits from competitive tendering, in terms
of public savings, are less than the cost in terms of lower
service provision. As a result, several other explanations have
been put forward, which I discuss below.
2.4.1 Introducing competitive tendering results in lower prices
and better service
In auction theory [7] it is reasoned that in the auctioning pro-
cess the auctioneer will be able to confiscate most of the social
surplus created by the service.
It is assumed that winning the auction is retaining a value
equal to the difference in efficiency between the winner and
the second best entrant with a profit similar to the difference in
efficiency [7]. The value of the expected outcome is the same
in all four forms of conventional auction, but the variation is
different. In the contracts in question, a first price, sealed en-
velope system is used.
Certain conditions have to be met, particularly the need for
several entrants, which will vary with the design of the auc-
tion. From experience in the Norwegian bus service industry,
however, between three and five competitors is sufficient for a
competitive outcome [11]. In relation to the taxi industry this
means that we can expect a competitive outcome in all major
urban areas, and in some rural areas where there is an active
minibus service. However, in most rural areas there is often
only one non-taxi minibus company and in some there are
only taxis providing transport services.
2.4.2 Lower price and reduced service—quality shading
Quality shading in the form of lower price and reduced service
is a hypothesis that has been presented in several mid-sized
cities. This refers to the argument that, with the introduction of
competitive tendering, the market is opened up to new smaller
dispatching companies, although they must have several
Bsecure^ assignments, such as transport for some public au-
thority, if they are to maintain their operations. They are un-
likely to compete well on the pre-booked market, because of
network economics, and on street market segments, where the
network economics are less important, and are small in all but
the largest cities in Norway. To secure these contracts, smaller
dispatchers submit low bids, but they are unable to secure a
steady supply of taxis as licence-holders generally prefer to be
attached to the incumbent. The licence-holder’s arguments are
based on real or perceived efficiency gains from being at-
tached to the incumbent, usually through having better access
to the pre-booked market segments.
In economic terms, this is a scenario where low quality
takes over from high quality, as the public authority is unable
to distinguish between high and low quality before the con-
tract period. Theoretically, this argument is related to
Akerlof’s [17] market for lemons.
2.4.3 Unsustainable industry
The hypothesis that the industry is unsustainable has been
fronted predominantly by the Norwegian Taxi Owners’
Association with examples from rural areas and abroad (usu-
ally Sweden). The argument is that the taxi industry is faced
with higher costs than the competingminibus industry, putting
it at a disadvantage in the competition for tendered contracts.
When disadvantaged, it will lose the auctions. As the contract
markets make up a large proportion of the income in rural
areas in particular, loss of this kind will result in a situation
where there is no longer any economic foundation for a taxi
service.
The economics of this argument are that competition takes
place on unequal terms. Taxis face stricter licensing require-
ments; in particular the taximeter, the need for a dispatcher and
the 24-h service at regulated prices. The result is that taxis
have higher fixed costs than the minibus industry. In areas
where contract work is a large share of the total, this is not
offset by access to other market segments, and taxis will have
to price higher and lose tenders. Again, this will result in
bankruptcies and a loss of 24-h service in relevant areas.
In addition, if it is accepted that tendered contracts are of
vital importance for the taxi industry, or for rural transport
service provision in general, a Bertrand [18] style competition
scenario can be constructed, where the loser in the auction
exits the market.
3 Empirical findings
The main conclusion from the Osland et al. study [1] was that
in Norway there had been little change in the availability of
taxis in rural areas in the period between the introduction of
competitive tendering and the study being carried out. The
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study concludes, however, that there were few cases where
there was actual competition on rural taxi contracts. Most
tenders received only one bid and this was usually the local
taxi service industry. However, there were cases where com-
petition was very real, particularly in cities with more than one
dispatching company and in some rural municipalities where
there was a well-established minibus industry.
The revenue breakdown for different groups of municipal-
ities (based on centrality) is illustrated in Fig. 2a, b on the basis
of information about taxis operating in Hedmark County in
eastern Norway, and including all taxis licensed within the
county. It can be seen in the Figure that public contracts con-
stitute the bulk of taxi revenue in the least central areas (69 %
on average in the sample). More surprising is that public con-
tracts account for more than half of the revenue in the central
municipalities in the sample.
3.1 Effects of competitive tendering
In cases where the taxi service industry has been successfully
challenged by a minibus company, the effects have been a
drastic reduction in the taxi industry. The example of two
neighbouring municipalities of similar size and centrality (il-
lustrated in Fig. 4a, b) reflects the difference.5
The economic development of the taxi service industry in
the municipality of Sør-Odal in Hedmark, Norway—develop-
ment typical of the industry in Norway—is illustrated in
Fig. 3a along with the same development over the same time
horizon, but for the neighbouring municipality of Eidskog, in
Fig. 3b. Here, the taxi service industry lost the tender for the
transport of patients in 2004 and of school children in 2006.
As a result, the number of available taxis in Eidskog dropped
from seven to two. In Sør-Odal the number of vehicles
remained constant over the period [1]. Reflected in the
Figures is that transport of the disabled dropped with reduc-
tion in the number of available taxis in Eidskog, even though
not directly in relation to the tenders.
Figures 2 and 3 show that contract work is important for the
taxi service industry and that the service available in other
market segments is to a certain degree dependent on number
of vehicles, which in turn is dependent on the amount of
contract driving.
Looking at data from the neighbouring county of Oppland,
two clear observations can be drawn: First, the indexed price
development of the different market segments (Fig. 4), and,
second, the development in kilometres driven per passenger
(Fig. 5).
The development in unit prices for taxis in different market
segments from a sample of about 90 % of those in Oppland
County is shown in Fig. 4. The line indicates the introduction
of competitive tendering. The most interesting observation is
that after the introduction of competitive tendering on the
health contracts the unit prices in this segment changed less
than in the other segments. In all periods the unit price is
lower, but after the introduction of competitive tendering the
unit price increase seemed to stop completely in this segment
but not in the others. In absolute numbers the average unit
price in 2007 varied from 13 kroner per kilometre for health
transport to 22 kroner per kilometre for transport paid by cred-
it card.
The distance driven by taxis divided by the number of
passengers transported in the different market segments is
shown in Fig. 5. Throughout the period, the longest trips have
been health contract driving, but distance has halved. As the
infrastructure has remained more or less constant in the peri-
od, the most likely explanation is that there were more pas-
sengers per vehicle in the health transport category at the end
of the period than at the start. And the most significant drop-
off in kilometres per passenger occurred before competitive
tendering was introduced.
4 Discussion
The relative importance of the contract market segments dif-
fers between areas with different degrees of centrality (see
Fig. 2a, b). One would therefore expect that the negative ef-
fects of competitive tendering would be felt most by the taxi
service industry in the outermost rural areas. However, as rural
communities typically have only one established transport op-
erator, namely the local taxi dispatcher, the scope for compe-
tition is limited.
Looking at the argument in 2.4.1 above, one might expect
the introduction of competitive tendering to have resulted in
lower prices and better service, and empirical experience sug-
gests (Fig. 4) that at least the lower price component has some
support. From interviews conducted in [5, 4], a clear indica-
tion is that quality, on average, has improved—informants
working in the health corporations and local administration
saw this as a result of competition being introduced in the
form of competitive tendering. Still, most of the interviewed
purchasers can point to single contracts where quality has
decreased or there have been issues in relation to quality.
The same is the case for the taxi companies, mostly pointing
the finger at minibus companies.
Vehicles have improved over the period, as have the
auditing abilities of the purchasers. There are examples, such
as those documented in [3], where a small dispatcher has had
difficulty delivering services at the level stipulated in the con-
tract, but according to [1] this seems to be the exception rather
5 The term Bcentrality^ is used based on the Norwegian pay-
roll tax definition. Norway is divided into seven areas with
different pay-roll tax rates, and highest in central areas. http://
www.lovdata.no/for/sf/sv/td-20121127-1213-001.html (last
visited July 2013).
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than the rule. There are a number of cases where the quality of
the taxi service has been questioned, but only a few can be
related to the introduction of competitive tendering.
The argument in Section 2.4.3, ‘Unsustainable industry’,
has some validity in the in-between areas, but not it seems in
outermost rural areas. Osland et al. [1] found that only four
municipalities out of 430 had lost their taxi service in the
period analysed and no direct support for the connection
between these and the introduction of competitive tendering.
As illustrated in Fig. 4b, however, in some areas there has
been a significant loss of service resulting from the taxi service
industry losing tenders to the minibus industry. This has af-
fected the supply of taxis not just in the contract market, but in
adjacent market segments, too. Also, as the allocation of taxi
licences is subject to a needs test, and tenders require that
capacity be documented when a bid is submitted, there is a
significant likelihood that the taxi service will be permanently
reduced in response to the loss of tendered contracts to the
minibus industry. The main factor limiting competition be-
tween taxis from different dispatchers is geographical distance
and the cost associated with empty kilometres [6].
As for unit price development, it is clear that, on average,
competitive tendering has resulted in lower prices. The expe-
rience from the bus industry indicates that this effect is linked
to the introduction of competitive tendering, and that the fu-
ture development of prices will follow the cost index [11].




































Fig. 2 a, b Revenue breakdown
for the taxi industry in different










































































Fig. 3 a, b Turnover in different taxi market segments, with retained and
lost tenders (Norwegian kroner), adopted from [1] Fig. 4 Indexed price development (NOK/km)
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and for technological developments contributing to further
reductions in unit costs. In one interview, a taxi owner indi-
cated that he expected a 30 % reduction of his unit costs as a
result of his changing from diesel to hybrid petrol–electric
vehicles.
Generalising about a very specific market is difficult.
However, the empirical findings in this and [1] suggest that
competitive tendering works well in markets where there is a
sufficient number of potential service providers—even in
entry-regulated markets—and where each tendered contract
constitutes a small part of the total market. In other words,
there is no contradiction between entry regulation and use of
competitive tendering, even in small markets such as the
taxi industry in general. However, in areas where there
are one or two service providers and the tendered con-
tracts constitute a large proportion of the total market,
there are challenges. In areas where there is only one
potential provider, there is no competition and compet-
itive tendering is not a suitable way of public procure-
ment. Nevertheless, from a macro perspective, Osland
et al. [1] showed that in the case of rural taxis this
did not result in loss of service. The most likely expla-
nation is the interdependence between service provider
and purchaser.
5 Conclusions
Competitive tendering and entry regulations are difficult to
combine, particularly in smaller markets. Still, in the case of
Norway this has not had dramatic consequences, probably
because of the lack of competition in rural communities. On
average, unit prices have dropped, but there are reports of
isolated cases of higher prices. In general, the quality of the
service has improved, although there are examples to the con-
trary. This research has shown that, within the Norwegian
regulatory framework, the challenge has not been to maintain
services to the outermost rural areas, as was the case in
Sweden, but to maintain the service in communities between
these areas and regional centres. This could be attributed to the
fact that in the outermost rural areas the entry regulation pro-
tects the incumbent from competition. In the in-between areas,
where the markets are larger, the taxi service industry is faced
with much stiffer competition from the minibus industry,
which is not entry regulated, and has a different cost structure.
A lesson learned from the Norwegian experiment of com-
bining competitive tendering with entry regulation is that it
works, at least in the short and medium term. However, it is
not without issue. Actors from both the minibus and taxi in-
dustries in competition over the same contracts creates more
competition. Different regulation means different cost pro-
files, and the effects on adjacent market segments can be sig-
nificant. A solution could be to link vehicle licences to the
tender or to include within contracts the non-profitable ser-
vices that taxi licence-holders are required to meet, so that
the public will not experience loss of service if or when a
non-taxi licence-holder is selected for transport on the part
of the health corporations.
In summary, the experience in the Norwegian taxi
service industry is that competitive tendering is no uni-
versal quick fix. In markets where the public authority
has a series of policy objectives, purchase of transport
services should reflect this to some extent. This can be
done either by including the non-market services in the
tenders or by requiring these service obligations to be
met by all operators. The evidence suggests that com-
petitive tendering is effective in creating price competi-
tion, where more than one actor can provide the service.
However, the experience also shows that the heteroge-
neity between sectors and between markets within the
same sector can result in different market responses to
the same regulation. This highlights the need to look
carefully at each market, and choose the method for
procurement suited for that particular market.
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